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Whites in Zimbabwe and Rhodesia: Hapana Mutsauko Here.
Is it the same difference?

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There is no intention on our part to use our majority to victimize the minority. We will ensure there is a place for everyone in this country. We want to ensure a sense of security for both winners and losers. (Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe's new Prime Minister, election night 1980)

If the new millennium, like the last . . . remains the age of the master race, of the master economy and the master state, then I am afraid we in developing countries will have to stand up and say: "Not again". (Robert Mugabe, July 2000 Millennium summit).[1]

In an effort to incite popular support once enjoyed after Zimbabwe's liberation struggle (1962-1980), President Robert Mugabe, as victor over white supremacy, today denounces his country's tiny white minority for racial privilege and supposed alien loyalties.[2] Until the mid-1990s, while he pursued national reconciliation after bloody civil war, Mugabe enjoyed respect abroad and popular support at home. Then at the polls his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) was twice rejected, especially by urban 'born frees', younger voters lacking experience of the liberation struggle. Rejection came as a 'no' vote in a February 2000 constitutional referendum to approve uncompensated confiscation of white commercial farms. In June, more partial[3] rejection came again in the shape of general elections; in which Morgan Tsvangira's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), despite ZANU-PF intimidation, won unprecedented representation in the 150-member Zimbabwean parliament, increasing anti-ZANU-PF MPs there from 3 to 57.[4] As Zimbabwe's economy descends into chaos, Mugabe, his party still intimidating its MDC opponents, prepares for 2002 presidential elections. To win them, his supporters badger the judiciary, attack free, non-government media and connive to occupy farms illegally, in defiance of the rule of law.[5]

With reference to the aforementioned crisis, this article examines white Zimbabweans and colonial Rhodesians. Its purpose is straightforward: to argue the inappropriateness of stereotyping Rhodesians, let alone white Zimbabweans. Today's white Zimbabweans, 70,000 amongst 12 millions, should not be held responsible for all that President Mugabe alleges. Nonetheless, his revival of militant anti-white rhetoric is significant: not only as an implausible attempt to deflect criticism from his own government's failings, but also as it raises serious questions about racial militancy itself.[6] In the early 1960s, African versions of that militancy lumped all Rhodesians together: irrespective of whether they were racists, reactionaries, moderates or progressives. To validate colonial liberalism - in other words, to differentiate among Rhodesians as historical actors -- this paper endorses a multiracial alternative to Black Nationalist militancy and white racial extremism.

Multiracialism, as its Rhodesian sympathizers saw it, was a stage of societal evolution defined by hegemonic whites: a stage prior to liberal rights for 'the civilized' through political reforms, not least 'qualified voting rights'. This multiracial alternative sought greater racial equity by encouraging socio-economic amelioration and growing racial tolerance in what was hoped would become a more inclusive Rhodesia. Where colonial liberalism stressed individual rights and responsibilities, colonial multiracialism - liberalism's preparatory stage - sought economic development to build a nation in which all could participate, free of racial prejudice, material want, and popular ignorance. Gradually through paternalistic acculturation, pragmatically through racial co-operation, 1950s multiracialists campaigned for 'privileges' to be given to 'civilized' elites,[7] who, it was supposed, would uplift their communities, making blacks more prosperous, whites more tolerant. Multiracialists sought to add to elite ranks acculturated individuals, who met the 'civilized' standards they believed efficacious in building a better Rhodesia, where suitable 'moderates' meeting those standards would be granted the privileges of 'the civilized'. Before 1958, racial co-operation was expected to erode segregation and ensure stability, goals from which liberal whites told blacks to expect elite then mass advantage. The ultimate goal was a society free of outside interference; one where liberals, moderates and non-racialists disagreed over the imminence of racial equity, the value of African achievement, but not the necessity of either.[8]

By 1962, however, radicalizing events had overtaken both this multiracial intent and the effort needed to realize it. From 1958 to 1962 -- years constituting a key quinquennium -- months, even days were climactic ones. They saw liberal white and elite African opinion overflow moderate rivulets into more militant channels. From the late 1950s denouncing moderation as elitist, militants claimed that multiracialists sought continued exclusion from the colonial mainstream of all those without an elite education. After such an education, anyone refusing this militant interpretation was denounced as a 'stooge'. Militants like James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Enos Nkala, Michael Mawema and Edison Zvogbo[9] attacked multiracialism as at best elitist, at worst, racist. Meantime, white militants in the Rhodesia Front denounced not only African nationalists, whom they did not take very seriously, but more especially the reformism of Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead (1958-1962), whom they thought of as in league with treacherous British politicians, betraying the white man in Central Africa. In full-throated protest, militants, black or white, alleged their racial opponents repressed or corrupted their like-pigmented fellows. In rejecting as bogus all cross-racial empathy, militant rhetoric did not reflect reality as much as respond to and influence it, especially during a climactic period from 1958 to 1962.

Taking their cue from such militant rhetoric, many western writers and scholars in denouncing the Rhodesia Front (RF) failed to credit or even distinguish credible white alternatives before 1962 to RF reaction. They preferred to demean multiracialism, disregarding it, to strengthen an elite mythology of continuous anti-colonial struggle that, in point of fact, strengthened significantly only from 1958. This militant nationalist's myth of continuous resistance to white supremacy was located in earliest colonial days. Post 1962 militants argued that multiracialism enervated African will to resist colonialism. That black legend of colonial liberalism has been embedded in most literature on Zimbabwe, starting with the seminal, and in their own times, invaluable works of Terence Ranger. According to the myth, anti-colonial struggle began with the pioneer column's 1890 invasion of Shona and Ndebele lands. It continues, ZANU-PF argues today, with Mugabe's efforts to free the land of British domination and usurp 'little Rhodesia's' place at the economy's commanding heights.[10]

Multiracialism, (White) Rhodesia, and Federation

In reality, multiracialists had attempted during the 1940s and 1950s, before elite patience wore away, to build bridges between cosseted white worlds and those of the disadvantaged black majority. They failed. Between 1958 and 1962, youthful elites embraced Pan-Africanist reveries, not the paternalistic, dreams of earlier generations.[11] The ultimate fate of multiracialism was dramatic: Europeans rejected it for the Rhodesia Front's intransigence in 1962 general elections.[12] Especially on its own terms, multiracialism was a complete failure. Before its electoral demise, though, elites expected, in ever-small numbers after 1958, colonial assimilation. Recognizing the importance of encouraging, acculturating and assimilating them, some Rhodesians likewise campaigned for such elite 'privilege'. Anticipating for more and more citizens mutually rewarding racial contacts, 1950s liberals and multiracialists, saw racial cooperation, *sui generis*, as progressive. At the heart of all post-1958 militancies, by contrast, was rejection of such co-operation. As the 'wind of change' reached gale-force proportions, militancy it was argued offered quicker liberation than multiracialism ever had (for some hindsight is an exact science!).

To legitimate post-1962 militancy, though, one need only point to RF intransigence, which left Africans no choice but acquiescence or agitation. Elites after 1962 elaborated on militancy that the RF's countervailing intransigence legitimated, using that party's white supremacist ideology as a brush with which to tar once credible multiracialism. It could be inexpedient for elites to accept their newfound militancy as having anything to do with undermining multiracial sentiments they had themselves once embraced. After 1962 black and white militants portrayed multiracialism as obstructive to the nationalist myths that both sets of militants used to buttress, legitimate and project into the past racial solidarities on which they built their rival political movements. The Rhodesian Front's was a myth of white nationalism. Rival African movements, from 1964 the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), propagated nationalists myths that were more legitimate, but scarcely more accurate than those of the Rhodesian Front.[13]

Initially, diverse intra-racial opinions co-existed in a country largely rural before 1945. Liberal hopes for multiracial progress and elite dreams of African acculturation co-existed with reactionary white feelings and traditional African communities, steadily undermined by capitalist penetration. Rhodesian colonialism was paternalistic, authoritarian and segregationist. Racial separation -- social, cultural and territorial - rather than militant resistance bred mutual black and white racial suspicions. Rhodesia was a racially authoritarian not a racially supremacist society. That may seem an over nice distinction. It did matter, though, whether Africans before 1958 struggled with limited opportunities to adapt to colonialism, or after 1962 saw their hopes regularly dashed by white inflexibility. It mattered because multiracial hope lost all credibility after Whitehead's 1962 electoral defeat. Racial militancy, moreover, was self-reinforcing. Without militant Black Nationalism, the reservations of moderate Rhodesians about the Rhodesia Front might never have been overcome. The converse was also true. Without the Rhodesia Front, the excesses of some African nationalists would never have been tolerated in urban townships. As elites made their militant choice, that choice reflected the rapid pace of post-1958 events. Its elevation into mythology showed contempt for earlier challenges to what became inescapable militancies, black or white, only after 1962.[14]

To re-legitimize multiracialism, it is time to challenge militant interpretations of the colonial history of the 1940s and 1950s. When, according to many writers, township proletariats, middle class Africans and rural-urban comrades escaped multiracial entrapment to achieve militant solidarity. Actually in elite eyes credible alternatives to such political and racial militancy existed until 1958-62. During the 1950s attractive to elite Africans, at least, were what Ian Hancock has called 'exercise(s) in adult education': secular liberal organizations like the Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia (IRASR), the Capricorn Africa Society (CAS) and the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party (SRLP). These organizations expressed their multiracial sentiment by calling on Rhodesians and elite Africans to pursue racial co-operation. By placing African issues on colonial agendas, these ginger groups won support from colonial politicians like Hardwicke Holderness,[15] Garfield Todd,[16] and Sir Edgar Whitehead.[17] It might be argued that both the groups and the politicians were mistaken in emphasizing social and economic amelioration, when they ought to have pursued the political rights that African nationalists were calling for from the late 1950s. However, limits to the reformism of Prime Ministers Todd and Whitehead suggest that campaigning for such rights would have got just as short shrift from most Rhodesians as Whitehead's reformism ultimately got in the 1960s.[18] The multiracial tactics of 'advanced liberals', while

appearing to offer escape from racial conflict, were as much products of colonial realities as the more typical views of Rhodesians like Godfrey Huggins, settler Prime Minister from 1934 to 1953.[19]

Until the late 1950s, then, black and white minorities, recognizing their mutual dependence, sought positive interracial contact: chiefly in African education, where Garfield Todd's Five Year Plan (1954-1959) reformed the teaching profession, key elite employer and shaper of wider African opinion. Invariably, under white hegemony, race relations and gradual reforms were paternalistic. Nonetheless, the multiracialists' dreams celebrated a meritocracy that would one day draw its leaders from all races. Such dreams seemed closest to realization in the early 1980s when Prime Minister Robert Mugabe pursued 'reconciliation' and, as the Conservative Alliance of Zimbabwe, the Rhodesia Front was an irrelevancy. Nineteen-fifties multiracial versions of what became 1980s non-racialism argued that as elites contributed to society, culture bar would replace colour bar. Whites would accept colonial reform, and Africans assimilate into Rhodesian society.[20] Responsibility for the failure of these dreams in the 1960s, be they ever so improbable, should not rest at the multiracialists' door, however naively misplaced their optimism now appears.

Post-1958 events, perspectives and personalities made militant, sectarian politics more potent than multiracial ones. Events thereafter, within and across both racial communities, encouraged deep racial suspicions, suspicions that grew as opinion makers questioned the will, intent and sincerity of adversaries increasingly seen in exclusively racial terms. In strident tones by 1962, militants were demanding what their adversaries in neither community would (or could) concede: '(white) independence' or immediate (black) majority rule, petitioning the outside world to force their adversaries' acquiescence. Militant whites wanted independence without compromising 'civilized (white) standards'. They took it from Britain with a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965. Militant blacks wanted, non-negotiable majority rule, a viable option only after white supremacist defeat in a bloody civil war lasting from 1972 to 1979.[21] This conflict followed the roller coaster of events marking our post-1958 quinquennium. It also consummated a bitter stalemate characterizing early Rhodesia Front years (1962-1972), as initial insurgency proved as ineffective as African leadership was fractious.

Nonetheless, to study diverse white and African opinions, as they emerged, inter-acted, then furiously spun apart, is not only to argue diversity of opinion across the color bar, it is also to understand Zimbabwe better. Multiracialists in the 1950s set a non-militant precedent for today's non-racialists. In the 1950s Mike Hove, Jasper Savanhu, Stanlake Samkange, Lawrence Vambe, Chad Chipunza and Patrick Rubatika were all multiracialists. While such men endorsed what ultimately proved illusionary hopes, white liberals enjoyed legitimacy many today find difficult to understand. Others, too, stood beside these multiracialists during the 1950s: among them 1970s militant nationalists like Herbert Chitepo, Leopold Takawira, Ndabaningi Sithole and Nathan Shamuyarira. Through acculturative endeavor, all these elites originally believed in the potency of familial, educational and racial uplift.[22] Their multiracialism was paternalistic and assimilative. It depended upon African efforts to reach 'standards' set by whites. What is clear, nonetheless, is the sincerity of colonial multiracialists; so all whites were not, as many argued in the 1970s, alike in negating serious reform, differing only in the crudity of their supremacist beliefs.[23]

In December 1962, however, a white majority opted to keep elites subservient, when those Africans had pressed for reform constitutionally, some persisting with multiracial demands even after 1958. In the lead-up to the 1962 general elections most elites, encouraged by pan-Africanism, attacked all alternatives to militant mobilization, pronouncing a plague upon both UFP and RF houses.[24] These nationalist attitudes not only sealed colonial Prime Minister Whitehead's fate, they were also a grave miscalculation. When black votes might have won African nationalists up to 15 seats in a new Southern Rhodesian parliament of 65 -- the support of any defeated nationalist transferring to Whitehead's United Federal Party (UFP) candidates[25] -- militant nationalist leaders intimidated away from the polls Africans, of whom under a new constitution 40,000 to 50,000 were entitled to vote. The explanation for this militant non-co-operation lies in the fact that many Africans were by then bitter at multiracial failures, excited over the 'freedom now' utopia Pan-Africanism appeared to promise. To understand the mistakes of leaders like Joshua Nkomo, Leopold Takawira, Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe, one must consider the affects of white society upon them.

Table 1: Southern Rhodesia's European Population, 1890-1966

Year	Whites	Percent of Total	Black/White	Year	Whites	Percent of Total	Black/White
1890	180	n/a	n/a	1941	68,954	4.7	17:1
1901	11,032	2.2	31:1	1951	135,596	6.3	20:1
1911	23,606	3.1	25:1	1961	221,000	5.6	21:1
1921	33,620	3.8	20:1	1964	209,000	4.8	22:1
1931	49,910	4.4	15.1	1966	213,000	4.6	23:1

(E. Weinrich, 'The Closed Society: White Settlers in Zimbabwe', *Tarikh*, 16, 2, p. 20)

If their optimism was ill informed, their expectations roseate, it was colonial segregation and Rhodesian prejudice -- with their youth and academic hubris -- that encouraged ill-founded pan-Africanist hopes.[26]

To the ultimate frustration of nationalists like Nkomo, Takawira, Sithole and Chikerema, most whites shared two inflexible illusions: first, that elites would acculturate into civilized society *without altering that society* (Africans must accept white standards); second that colonial progress depended upon Anglophone immigrants, who in Central Africa would build another British dominion. Moderate colonials and right wing Rhodesians believed in selective immigration of the 'right sort' from the British Isles. Only liberal Rhodesians stressed elite acculturation, hence their emphasis upon education, European and African, as the means to a better future. Multiracialists were most optimistic: reactionaries, given their improbable immigrationist aims, alternately pessimistic, defensive, and dogmatic. White society oscillated between these verities - immigration and education. It never went as far rightward as South Africa or as far leftward as Britain and liberals locally wished. Although racially exclusive, whites were until the late 1950s sufficiently self-confident to tolerant multiracial dreaming.[27]

This was so, because so many of them drew strength (some liberals hope) from postwar economic prosperity and progress. In Salisbury and Bulawayo, growth and consequent industrialization seemed exponential. The value of the colony's manufacturing base climbed from £5,107,000 in 1938, to £9,458,000 in 1943 to reach £197,458,000 by 1965. Such prosperity attracted unprecedented immigration, creating an urban market for local secondary industries. Salisbury's all-race 1931 population of 20,386 reached 162,000 by 1956, as the colony underwent postwar urban as well as industrial revolution. A white population of 82,386 in 1946 reached 135,596 by 1951. [28] Between then and 1961, another 88,000 immigrants arrived, taking white population to 223,000 (table 1). [29] This expansion accentuated rather than challenged local particularism and prejudice. One 1959 study found it took just five years for new arrivals to adopt predominant attitudes to race, politics and colonial economics. Patricia Chater of St. Faith's mission noted, 'the new immigrant . . . finds a climate of opinion against racial integration. When he comes to Rhodesia he is the new boy, he must keep quiet and wait'.[30] Ongoing segregation, in other words, sealed whites into a laager mentality. Events after 1958 provoked them to defend it vociferously, if in the long run ineffectually.[31]

In the early 1950s, all this - segregation, industrialization, urbanization, immigration -- left British Central Africa short of capital.[32] To facilitate immigration, attract investment and draw Northern Rhodesian (Zambian) copper revenues south, Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins campaigned to amalgamate the Rhodesias, north and south of the Zambezi. Concerned lest South African race policies (apartheid) cross the Limpopo and hopeful a bigger stage might strengthen local liberalism, British politicians allowed Huggins to federate not amalgamate Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) with Nyasaland (Malawi).

Table 2: Rhodesian Migration, 1921-1965

Year(s)	Ingress	Egress	Net Influx	Year	Ingress	Egress	Net Influx
1921–26	9,400	6,676	+2,724	1958	12,900	5,300	+7,600
1926–31	20,106	12,685	+7,421	1959	8,146	4,600	+3,500

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1931–36   9,090   7,058    +2,032    1960    7,430    5,900    +1,500
1936–41  12,850   7,157    +5,693    1961    6,627    8,000    −1,400
1941–46   8,250   6,192    +2,058    1962    6,062    7,400    −1,300
1946–51  64,634  17,447   +47,187    1963    5,091   10,540    −5,420
1951–56  62,027  19,026   +43,001    1964    6,170   13,400    −7,230
1957     17,400   5,100    +7,600    1965   11,128    6,665    +4,463
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[Leys, p. 74 & T. Bull, *Rhodesian Perspective*, (Michael Joseph, London; 1967), p. 92]

The steady decline from the late 1950s of the resulting federation (1953-1964), especially after it had started so well, escalated racial suspicions, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, where, unlike the north, cross-racial support for federation had early existed. Racial partnership, a federal slogan of the prosperous 1950s, had offered moderates a multiracial banner to rally around. Far from being realized, however, racial partnership remained amorphous into the late 1950s, before disappearing entirely with federation itself in the early 1960s. During the early 1950s, though, colonial liberals and Britain's governing Conservatives saw federation as an anti-apartheid bulwark. Below the Zambezi, to elite African and moderate Rhodesian, federation was attractive, despite federal designs on sovereign independence (dominion status). Elites accepted the proviso that only economic contributions more significant than the African's current cheap, inefficient labor would create the prosperity necessary to gradually extend civilized rights to the African masses. Substantial elite opinion, south, if not north of the Zambezi was amenable to gradual progress and acculturative privilege, provided British and settler leaders gave a firm but fair lead.

In the northern protectorates, however, where since 1938 elites had rejected 'association' with a segregationist south, politically aware Africans opposed federation from the start, seeing in it only a partnership between 'the rider and the horse'. Advocates of multiracialism expected federal prosperity to mitigate such opposition.[33] It did not. Politicians, like Sir Roy Welensky, federal Prime Minister, 1956-1963, established no rapport with elite Africans. Unlike Whitehead, Welensky refused to accelerate reform, if it meant losing white Rhodesian support. In Welensky's Northern Rhodesia, Henry Nkumbula's African National Congress (ANC) and Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) agitated for concessions, and rejected federation outright. In Nyasaland, Hasting Banda's Malawi Congress Party (MCP) won even greater outside attention. When federal authorities used a supposed Congress 'murder plot' as pretext for troop movements into Nyasaland, the protectorate, under a British governor, Sir Robert Armitage, erupted in violence. Britain's Devlin Commission described the official response as, 'temporarily no doubt' constituting 'a police state'.[34] By their militancy, Northern African parties set precedents that nationalists further south strove to emulate. Not least as in Salisbury, the federal capital, northern nationalists benefited from prosperous ANC/UNIP and MCP branches.

Until the late 1950s, though, federal and Southern Rhodesian leaders contained the white anxieties these Black Nationalist movements aroused. In the early 1950s, the total collapse of Southern Rhodesia's anti-federal All-African Convention characterized radical black politics there. Only the All-African Convention's turbulent president, Charles Mzingeli deferred, until unfashionable, multiracial embrace: in 1961, he attended Whitehead's constitutional review as a UFP delegate. Stanlake Samkange B.A., in a volt-face marring an otherwise worthy career, stood, while secretary of the anti-federal convention, for a Southern Rhodesian federal seat![36] The victors of those elections, Mike Hove (Matebeleland) and Jasper Savanhu (Mashonaland) upheld multiracialism in the federal parliament. Elected by white voters, they were sponsored by the federal UFP. Their credibility depended, therefore, upon the UFP rather than anything they themselves might achieve. Theirs was an untenable position, as nationalists pursued militant ambitions, federation faltered, and whites rallied to a reactionary Dominion Party (DP) cause that the RF inherited.[37]

While Hove and Savanhu awaited a multiracial future, socio-economic protests in Bulawayo's industrial areas (1948), on Wankie's coal mines (1954), and by Salisbury bus boycotters (1956) took on mythic, militant significance for youthful nationalists James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, who formed the City Youth League in 1956, merging it with the established, but moribund African National Congress in 1957. Fear for the future galvanized resulting myth making, because elites increasingly feared 'settler' politicians bent on independence from Britain, before Britain could force reform/abolition of segregation. The Youth League attracted talented, well-educated Africans into first township, then national politics. Initially elites better established than Chikerema or Nyandoro, Joshua Chinamano for instance, feared 'settler' constitutional

development quite as much as they sympathized with or aspired to lead populist African protest. Their immediate concern was for another constitutional or dominion precedent, that of South Africa.

There Union Government after achieving dominion status in 1910 had turned by 1948 to apartheid, leading in 1961 to South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth (an association of ex-members of the British Empire). British progressive opinion shared African fears that, given unrestrained control, Central Africa's settlers might pursue a Rhodesian version of Apartheid. Concessions to gain independence from Britain could be revoked once dominion status was attained, and Britain's reserved clauses nominally protecting African interests in the 1923 self-governing constitution removed. Those reserved clauses were nominal only, as Britain had never invoked them, even against segregationist Rhodesian legislation. As whites campaigned for dominion status, elite multiracial faith diminished. With federal constitutional review approaching in 1960, the concessions 'settler' politicians willingly made to propitiate Britain or allay 'moderate' African fears were insufficient for African nationalists, but intolerable to white reactionaries who resented all Whitehead's concessions as craven submission to Britain and intemperate African agitation.[38]

The resulting growth of reactionary white thinking can be explained in terms of the volatility and isolation of settler society, as well as the course of imperial and colonial affairs. Europeans moved in and out of the colony and the northern territories at will (table 2). Many of those deciding Rhodesia's future in 1962 were recent arrivals. This applied even to DP leader William Harper, a disappointed Raj refugee. Frank Clements, former Salisbury Lord Mayor, saw Rhodesians as expatriates not patriots, averring that 'in the absence of any external or discernible internal threat, divisiveness was free to develop within white society itself'.[39] The chances of such a society undergoing multiracial, let alone liberal transformation were slim, but for a long time that was unclear. Elites likewise believed, until the early 1960s, in possible colonial assimilation. As they abandoned that belief, whites reacted against their legitimate, escalating demands, while elites themselves sought popular support to take 'rights' hitherto petitioned for as 'privileges'. In short, over our key quinquennium opinions transformed, reflecting between 1958 and 1962 a heady mix of racial, national and international, as well as imperial and constitutional conflicts.

The Key Quinquenium, 1958 to 1962: From Multiracialism to Militancy

Partially, at least, British ties among Rhodesia's ruling elite underlay the original optimism of black and white multiracialists. Despite the inglorious record of her accommodations with racial prejudice, not least the grant of dominion status to South Africa in 1910, Britain had a symbolic role emboldening liberal sentiment in 1950s Rhodesia. Her liberalism offered a precedent for reformist adaptation to industrial change. Britain's example seemed a polestar by which black and white could steer each other's tolerant minorities into a brighter future.[40] During the early 1960s, for differing, opposed reasons blacks and whites felt increasingly betrayed by Britain. Rhodesians looked to Britain to secure their future within a British Empire that was itself crumbling. Africans looked to Britain to help them force majority rule in 'Zimbabwe', as colonial secretary Iain McLeod had assisted in Zambia and Malawi. The British themselves tried to loosen an imperial albatross from around their necks, as Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) sought European Economic Community membership. After a 1959 federal state of emergency, British, Rhodesian and African expectations parted company. Urgently federal authorities pressed for 'independence', while Whitehead precipitated reform to stifle impetuosity on nationalist left, racialist right. Spreading with Macmillan's 'wind of change', pan-Africanist sentiment inspired nationalists, but incited racialists. Multiracial minorities, in consequence, also abandoned positive if circumscribed cross-racial ties to indict black or white opponents.

One-time Rhodesian liberal, A.J.A. Peck typified hardening white attitudes. Initially in support of a reformist 1961 constitutional referendum, Peck ferried a campaigning Whitehead around for a victorious, but misleading electoral triumph. Although Rhodesians accepted the new constitution, subsequent fears about Harold Wilson's Labour government (1964-1970) and suppositions about its partiality for African nationalism provoked the RF to UDI. Soon Peck was arguing that the British had betrayed Rhodesia. 'Promising' independence if Rhodesians accepted the 1961 Constitution, then denying it them after they, as the British wished, endorsed that constitution.

What to Peck seemed irrational nationalist campaigning further undermined his multiracialism. He labeled the African nationalists, amongst who were those once sharing his multiracial vision,

> The clique of nationalist leaders [who] know well that a qualitative franchise is the surest way to maintain wise government, and that the responsible African in Rhodesia who has made a success of his own life, and who is hence qualified for the vote, is unlikely to be impressed by the excesses of gentlemen who . . . seek a political short cut to influence and affluence.[41]

Paternalistically, Peck preferred to believe 'his Africans' disinterested in nationalist politicking, proof against externally inspired subversion, be it from Ghana, Egypt or London. Such hardening white opinion was vital: not least, in transforming elite thinking.[42]

Unlike most whites, blacks knew justice delayed was justice denied. Across our key quinquennium, elite thinking also transformed. In 1955 Lawrence Vambe spoke of progress:

> At first, it was the difficult struggle of casting off the slough of superstition and indolence -- the worst enemies of progress. In this, the missionary influence and medical science played notable roles. The missionary brought with him a superior religion, which appealed to the Black man, who, by nature, is religiously inclined.

Two decades later (1972) Vambe saw only colonialism's evils:

> Ours, therefore could be said to have been a more civilized society than that to be found anywhere in the white-controlled towns and mining compounds in the Southern Rhodesia of the early 'twenties. Life could be and often was very satisfactory, if not idyllic, until it was disturbed by external interference, in most cases from the Church, prying police or individual white men.[43]

Such transformation began in February 1958 with Garfield Todd's removal from the premiership by colleagues fearful his 'extreme liberalism' -- a very Rhodesian concept -- might alienate white voters before the next elections. The trust elites like Vambe placed in Todd reflected his services in African education: Dadaya Mission (1933) was his. There was too Todd's unusual accessibility to Africans, his opposition to blatant prejudice. For many elite Africans, Todd's removal signaled the zenith of multiracialism, the start of racial polarization.

Todd's prime ministerial failure, though, stemmed as much from his breaking of an unspoken rule of colonial life, as it did from any substantial reform he achieved. His mistake was to up-stage colleagues (not least fellow liberal Roy Welensky) turning them into personal as much as professional rivals. As a 'conviction politician' -- and in the eyes of colleagues like Sir Patrick Fletcher, he was a 'Johnny come lately too'-Todd had the temerity to treat Africans warmly: thus the African myth of him as the man who might have saved racial peace. In fact, Todd's achievements, the 1958 Industrial Conciliation Act, the 1956-7 Tredgold franchise and his Five Year Education Plan, were cautious, abortive portents of an unrealized future (as good a definition of multiracialism that, as any). His later public statements escalated tensions: Todd did more to polarize feeling than his government did to liberalize colonial politics. For Todd after 1958, 'a traitor with the black nationalists', there was precious little middle ground.

The initial commitment of Todd's successor, Sir Edgar Whitehead to draconian security legislation roused unrest to black left and white right. On his return from Washington D.C., to replace Todd as Prime Minister, Whitehead, in seeking a parliamentary seat, suffered defeat in an April 1958 Hillside (Bulawayo) by-election. Since his party had merely appointed him Prime Minister, Whitehead needed electoral endorsement for legitimacy's sake. Having failed to gain that legitimacy in a Bulawayo by-election, Whitehead was forced to call general elections for June 1958. His United Federal Party (UFP) barely survived those elections; hence, Whitehead's harsh treatment of African nationalists throughout 1959 and into early 1960. Prior to the Nyasaland Emergency of 1959, Whitehead declared a state of emergency to incarcerate local nationalists, associating them thereby with northern colleagues in Southern Rhodesian prisons (the only ones able to accommodate all those arrested). A technocrat, who had served Huggins as a minister, Whitehead was more liberal than any of this suggests.

Typifying Whitehead's dilemma, his July 1960 arrests of (African) National Democratic Party (NDP) leaders Michael Mawema and Sketchley Samkange polarized racial opinion. Before then, and the rioting ensuing from those arrests, many Rhodesians believed racial tranquility had endured in the colony since 1898. While whites applauded Whitehead for re-establishing township law and order, blacks rejected his arrests due to the deaths of 11 African in the subsequent disorders. Struggling with reforms he knew to be in Rhodesia's best interest, Whitehead treated African agitators sternly, for he knew 'law and order' popular with his white electors.[44] Todd's reaction to Whitehead's pandering to white prejudices, his call for British intervention, stimulated the intransigence that nurtured the Rhodesia Front. Intransigence already incited by events in the Belgian Congo (Congo-Kinshasa), where Welensky, as federal Prime Minister, connived with Katangese secessionist leader, Moises Tshombe. To Rhodesians, Congolese anarchy -- threats there to white lives and property -- foreshadowed things they feared at home, if local nationalists had their way. To black militants 'mobilizing' the masses in African townships, 'Tshombist', by contrast, became an abusive term preceding some act of intimidation, usually against an 'African stooge'.

Having won a whites-only (July) referendum on his new 1961 constitution, Whitehead set a new course. He announced dramatic reforms, which he promised to accelerate if his UFP party won general elections due in late 1962. After authoritarianism to regain white support, came reform to secure African votes. Whitehead needed the support of black multiracialists to make up for the white irreconcilables his new 'extreme liberal' policy had lost him. At the head of an increasingly militant (African) National Democratic Party, however, former multiracialist Joshua Nkomo by rejecting the 1961 constitution mortally wounded Whitehead's new approach. As evidence of Nkomo's earlier multiracialism, he had attended a 1952 conference on federation; then stood unsuccessfully in resulting federal elections. To his militant followers in 1961, though, Nkomo initial interest in Whitehead's constitution appeared another of his unworthy compromises.

Nkomo's approach produced the first break in nationalist ranks, a break subsequently stifled by his reservation of his position on the constitution. That break was Michael Mawema's Zimbabwe Nationalist Party. Today, the hostile views of militants like Mawema about the 1961 constitution deserve re-assessment. Negotiated with Britain, Rhodesia's new constitution provided for 15 black seats on an African 'B' roll of 50,000, and 50 white seats on a European 'A' roll of 90,000 voters. Cross voting, a multiracial ruse, ensured 'A' and 'B' voters affected the outcome in each other's constituencies: each moderating the other's irreconcilables. Following pan-Africanist sentiment, though, Leopold Takawira denounced Nkomo's initial open mindedness over the new constitution. Much speculation has ensued, about whether Nkomo changed his mind, and if so who or what influenced him. Only oral historiography and research in Zimbabwe's National Archives, as yet uncatalogued for the late 1950s, will settle these issues.[45]

From a liberal point of view, however, Southern Rhodesia by 1962 had one of the world's most progressive electoral laws - the rolls and registration were another matter. Single Transferable Voting (STV), proportional representation, by which voting percentages decide a party's final share of seats, saved the UFP in 1958 by denying the Dominion Party (DP) victory on 'second preference'. As the UFP knew, 'extreme liberals' voting for Todd's United Rhodesia Party (his revived party of June 1958) were unlikely to support the DP, precursor to the RF. So under STV 'single' votes for URP losers transferred on 'second preference' to UFP, not DP candidates. Had a 'first past the post system' operated, as in the November 2000 U.S. elections, URP votes would not have become UFP ones. The DP would have won. In 1962, the DP's successor the RF did win, for too few Africans defied nationalist electoral boycott to bring UFP victory. African failure to vote meant too few votes or 'second preferences' to overturn the RF's first preference lead among whites. Whitehead's 1962 electoral defeat, 35 RF to 29 UFP MPs, aborted a liberal plurality attempted from local liberals, multiracial blacks, constitutional reform and imperial cajolery. Because of their electoral boycott, African nationalists share responsibility for that UFP defeat (some arguing theirs a creditable strategy, as all whites, not least Whitehead, were untrustworthy).[46]

From mistrust, then, Whitehead's Black Nationalist opponents rejected his reforms (he had thrice banned their parties in 1958, 1961 and 1962). They also supposed a better majority-ruled world imminent through Pan-Africanist liberation. Here was the militant nationalists' gravest miscalculation. Majority rule, without some degree of white acquiescence, was never a realistic option in 1962, as thirteen years of insurgency and civil war to 1979 would show. When the UFP's Build-a-Nation and Claim-a-Vote campaigns failed to put enough Africans

onto the rolls (only 10,632 of a potential 40-50 thousand), then failed again to persuade even enfranchised Africans to vote (only 2,577),[47] Whitehead lost the electoral advantage black multiracialism offered, and failed to reinforce those whites ready to countenance significant reform. Potentially effective, multiracialism ended with Whitehead's defeat at the hands of Winston Field's Rhodesia Front on 14 December 1962. Rhodesians bear ultimate responsibility for that denouement. They had frustrated Africans and thereby nourished political and racial militancy. The question Rhodesians thought they faced - should they surrender to African pressure or protect themselves from alien threat -- was ill conceived. Outnumbered 23 to 1 in 1962 (see table 2), Rhodesia's white voters failed to see that although they had strength enough to make racial conflict inevitable, they lacked power sufficient to ensure white hegemony.[48]

Real decisions were taken on 14 December 1962. Whitehead had tried to recruit African 'moderates'. Still he offered less reform of land, labor, education and colour bar than elites could accept, more concessions than most whites would countenance.[49] The black moderates Whitehead had hoped might compensate him for votes lost to the RF failed to turn out: discouraged by intimidation, suspicions of Whitehead's motives, and the complexity of voter registration. These non-voters were decisive, although most pundits in 1962 had expected UFP victory. To argue from earliest days, then, that all Africans resisted colonialism, all Europeans supported white supremacy simply belittles multiracialism to inflate militancy. Multiracial demise followed dramatic shifts of opinion from gradualism, cooperation and paternalism to militancy, racism and reaction. Those shifts reflected black and white responses to rapidly changing events. At source, multiracial failure resulted from majority colonial indifference to African interests, while subsequent decisions on either side of a steadily growing racial divide complicated matters. Whether supporters of African nationalism or not, elites were right to expect more than Whitehead offered in 1962. Where militant erred was in supposing majority rule imminent, and in escalating matters to provoke outside intervention.

This paper does not take issue with African nationalist objectives, only the means used in pursuing them. That militant nationalists rejected multiracialism in the 1960s is indisputable; whether in rejecting it, elites made white backlash more likely is worth considering. Despite the arguments of ZANU-PF activists, only as colonial politicians polled a predominantly white electorate in 1962 did its response make racial conflict inescapable. One must study multiracialism afresh, to recognize that only from 1958 did multiracial sentiment become a much-maligned rival to fractious black and white nationalisms. In that light, attacking all whites as racial bigots, all elites as ZANU-PF sympathizers, offers little past, present or future insight (or hope for economic prosperity). [50] Rhodesians never were as undifferentiated a mass of racial bigots as some supposed in the 1970s and 1980s. Recognizing past liberal and multiracial options is important, as it again opens up non-racial possibilities. These have clearer historical precedents when the past emerges from nuanced historical narrative. When it comes wrapped in nationalist mythologies, there is less scope for political compromise. Contrary to both racial and nationalist mythologies, liberals attempted sporadic reform, but failed due to Rhodesia's privileged, inflexible electorate to integrate talented, disadvantaged blacks into the equitable society they hoped for.

Endnotes

1. Robert Mugabe after the April 1980 elections that brought Rhodesia freedom as Zimbabwe. Quoted from David Smith and Colin Simpson, *Mugabe*, (London: Sphere Books; 1981), 205.

2. For Anglo-Zimbabwean relations during the 1980s and 1990s, including disputes over land reform, gay rights and the citizen's arrest of Mugabe for homophobia attempted in London see, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_692000/692638.stm.

3. Currently, the struggle for power in Zimbabwe rages in the courts, where not least among issues at stake are the MDC opposition's claims that June 2000 electoral irregularities in 39 seats necessitate by-elections. See *Election 2000: The Media War*, (MMPZ, Harare; 2000).

4. These figures understate the MDC's achievement. Prior to June 2000, of opposition MPs two were from ZANU-Ndonga, the late Ndabaningi Sithole's regionally based, Ndau, party, and the other was a popular

ZANU-PF defector, Margaret Ndongo.

5. A chronology of Zimbabwe's current crisis is available on the UN's integrated regional information network (IRIN) at, http://www.reliefweb.int/IRIN/sa/countrystories/zimbabwe/20010219b.phtml.

6. Militant mythology had two premises: belief that Africans struggled continuously against colonial rule; belief that élites schooling explained early élite failure to embrace that struggle. For a recent anthology shot through with these assumptions see, *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe, 1890-1990*, (ed. Canaan S. Banana), (The College Press, Harare; 1989).

7. The term élite describes the westernized Africans that advanced schooling kept ahead of average black academic accomplishment. Theirs' was a shifting status, equal to a Std. 6 pass in 1939, Junior Certificate in 1950, and a full secondary education by 1955. In the early 1960s, only a B.A. degree brought highest status. Acculturation is, 'that process of culture change in which more or less continuous contact between two or more culturally distinct groups results in one group taking over elements of the culture of the other group or groups.' R.Redfield, R. Linton, and M.J. Herskovits 'Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation', *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 38, 1936, 149-152.

8. Multi-racialism elevated racial co-operation and anticipated greater racial equity. See, Richard Gray, *The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland*, (OUP, London; 1960), 23, 54. Racists, in this context, believed in the biological inferiority of people physically distinct from themselves. See Philip Mason, Race Relations (OUP,) for this point of view. Such racism can be distinguished from racial prejudice, but the semantics of these terms need not detract from the argument presented here, nor reflect the author's own private view.

9. Robert Cary and Diana Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders in Rhodesia*, (Books of Bulawayo, Bulawayo; 1977), 41, 50, 57, 73.

10. E.P. Makambe, *African Protest Movements in Southern Rhodesia before 1930: An Ideological Appreciation of the Socio-Political Roots of Protest Movements* (Pasadena, California Institute of Technology; 1982) and Griff Foley, 'Learning in the Struggle: The Development of Political Consciousness among Zimbabweans in the 1930s', *Zimbabwean History*, Vol. 12, 1981, 47-67.

11. Ian Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953-1980*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 1.

12. Details on these elections are in *Source Book of Parliamentary Elections and Referenda in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1962*, (Ed. F.M.G. Willson, comp. Gloria C. Passmore and Margaret T. Mitchell), Dept. of Government, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Salisbury; 1963), 189-217.

13. Zvobgo, Chengetai J. M., 'Southern Rhodesia under Sir Edgar Whitehead: 1958-1962', *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, II, 4 (1977), pp. 481-92.

14. Pragmatism was the acme of black politics. The poor rarely afford as many principles as the privileged. But see T.D. Shopo, 'Black Liberalism Revisited: Essay Review', *Zambezia*, 1977, 5 (i), 91-94

15. Hardwicke Holderness, *Lost Chance: Southern Rhodesia, 1945-1958*, (Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare; 1985).

16. Ruth Weiss with Jane L. Parpart, *Sir Garfield Todd and the Making of Zimbabwe*, (British Academic Press, London; 1999).

17. Remarkably little has been written on Sir Edgar, but see his pre-1945 autobiography in Rhodes House, Oxford, Edgar Whitehead, typescript autobiographical manuscript MSS Afr. S. 1482/1a.

18. Ian Hancock, 'Sane and Pragmatic Liberalism: the Action Group in Bulawayo, 1955-1965', *Rhodesian History*, Vol. 7, 1976, 65-83, and 'The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia, *Rhodesian History*, Vol. 9, 1979, 41-63. Michael O West, '"Equal Rights for All Civilized Men": Elite Africans and the Quest for "European" Liquor in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1924-1961', *International Review of Social History*, XXXVII (1992), 376-397.

19. Gann, Huggins.

20. As one African newspaper explained: *The colour bar will diminish . . . as the African becomes civilised. Colour bar mainly owes its origins to the very different social habits of the races and will still exist if the social habits continue to differ widely. Therefore it behooves all men of goodwill to work for the gradual narrowing of the gaps that exist . . .between the two communities . . . the field of race relations should keep pace with the times. Bantu Mirror* (hereafter *BM*), 'Does God Approve Racial Segregation?', Vol. 19, no. 551, 5th March 1955.

21. Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, *Rhodesians 'Never Die': Rhodesian Society in the 1970s*, (OUP, Oxford; 1993), 3-14

22. B.N. Mnyanda, *In Search of Truth; a Commentary on Southern Rhodesian Native Policy* (Kitabs, Bombay; 1954) 54. See Michael West's, 'African middle-class Formation in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1965', *Ph.D. thesis*, Harvard University, 1990, 233-243.

23. For an example of liberal Rhodesia opinion of the early 1960s see, R. Auret, *Towards a Rhodesian Nation - Independence, Immigration and Integration*, (Bulawayo, Rhodesian Printers Ltd; June 1961) in the Welensky Papers, box 587, file 4, ff. 1-14

24. Founded in April 1962, the RF had reactionary antecedents in Confederate and Dominion Parties.

25. See page 20-21.

26. See Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Southern Rhodesia*, (Transatlantic Arts, New York; 1965), 67 & 163. John Day, *International Nationalism, The Extra-Territorial Relations of Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists*, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London; 1967) Ibid, 'Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists and the 1961 Constitution', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7, 2 (1969), 211-47. Ibid, 'The Creation of Political Myths: African Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 2, no. 1, 1975, 52-65.

27. The best guides to this period is still James Barber, *Rhodesia: the Road to Rebellion* (OUP, London; 1967) and Richard Gray, *The Two Nations: aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland*, (OUP, London; 1960). A good nationalist perspective is Ngwabi Bhebe, 'The National Struggle, 1957-62', 50-116, in *Turmoil and Tenacity, Zimbabwe 1890-1990*, (ed. Canaan S. Banana), (College Press, Harare; 1989).

28. World War 2 brought prosperity from wartime shortages that encouraged import substitution through local industrialization. At the same time, Rhodesian tobacco exports boomed. High prices for other commodities, especially Northern Rhodesia copper, inflated by Korean War stockpiling, enhanced this unprecedented wealth. C.H. Thompson and H.W. Woodruff, *Economic Development in Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Dennis Dobson, London; 1954).

29. See Colin Leys, *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia* (OUP, Oxford; 1959), 21 and *Year Book and Guide to the Rhodesias and Nyasaland* (SAR Tourist Bureau, Johannesburg; 1940), p. 397. George Kay, *Rhodesia: a Human Geography*, (University of London Press, London; 1970), 130.

30. Cyril A. Rogers and C. Frantz, *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behaviour of the White Population*, (Yale University Press, New Haven; 1962), 154, also Cyril A. Rogers and C. Frantz,

'Length of Residence and Race Attitudes of Europeans in Southern Rhodesia'. *Race* 3, no. 2 (May 1962), pp. 46-54; Patricia Chater, *Grass Roots: The Story of St. Faith's Farm in Southern Rhodesia*, (Hodder and Stoughton, London; 1962), 65.

31. Doris Lessing, *Martha Quest* (M. Joseph, London; 1952), 154. *Also A Proper Marriage* (M. Joseph, London; 1954), *A Ripple from the Storm* (M. Joseph, London; 1958), and, *Landlocked* (Macgibbon and Kee, London; 1965). See M.C. Steele, '"Children of Violence" and 'Rhodesia: A Study of Doris Lessing as Historical Observer', *Central African Historical Association*, local series pamphlet, no. 29, 1974; also Phimister, 181-182.

32. For a liberal review of federal affairs, see Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt, *A New Deal in Central Africa*, (Praeger, New York; 1960), especially, 'The Meaning of Good Government in Central Africa' and 'The Essentials of a New Deal', by Bernard Chidzero.

33. For Marxist analysis, Giovanni Arrighi, *The Political Economy of Rhodesia*, (Mouton, The Hague; 1967), but also, 'Marxist Taxonomy Comes to Rhodesia, Book Review of G. Arrighi, The Political Economy of Rhodesia', *Rhodesian Journal of Economics*, Vol. 1, no. 3, 43-49. Clements, 61-75, also Richard Hodder-Williams, *White Farmers in Rhodesia, 1890-1965: A History of the Marandellas District*, (Macmillan, London; 1983.

34. Cmnd. 815 (1960) Report of Nyasaland Committee of Enquiry (Devlin Report).

35. Despite its settler perspective other works must be measured against, J.R.T. Wood's *The Welensky Papers: A History of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, (Graham Publishing, Durban; 1983), See also R. I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: the Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge; 1967).

36. An insight on Samkange and his attitudes can be found in the *Welensky Papers*, handlist at Rhodes House Oxford (comp. J.F. Hargrave, Bodleian Library, Oxford; 1995). As local representative for the South African magazine Drum, Samkange sent Welensky 20 questions, which Welensky took the trouble to answer fully, Box 292, file 1, ff 1-14.

37. For Savanhu's evolving opinion see, 'Social Security: The Native Problem in Southern Rhodesia, An African Viewpoint by J.Z. Savanhu'. The pamphlet's frontispiece bears the rubric 'the people that sat in darkness have seen a great light'. Evidence of Savanhu's service as a federal M.P. is located in the Welensky Papers, in box 666, file 7.

38. Robert Blake, *A History of Rhodesia*, (Alfred Knopf, New York; 1978), 189-194 & 333-344.

39. Ethel Tawse Jollie, *The Real Rhodesia*, (Hutchinson, London; 1924), 106.

40. For Anglo-Rhodesian relations, Martin Chanock, *Unconsummated Union: Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa 1900-45* (Manchester, MUP, 1977). During federation see, Patrick Keatley, *The Politics of Partnership, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London: Penguin, 1963), T.R.M. Creighton, The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation , (London: Faber and Faber, 1960) and Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt, *A New Deal in Central Africa*, (New York: Praeger, 1960).

41. A.J.A. Peck, *Rhodesia Accuses*, (Three Sisters, Salisbury; 1966) p. 74, and the *Christian Recorder*, 'Establishment of Community Centers in Towns urged, Advocate A.J. Peck real African need for this speaking in London' Vol. 10, no. 29, 28th November 1957.

42. Peck, p. 74. A.J.A. Peck, a lawyer, continues to uphold the values of colonial liberalism as '*The Commentator' in Parade*, 'Zimbabwe's most widely read newsmagazine, 'nearly two million readers'. Parade itself was founded to propagate cultural renaissance in the late 1940s.

43. 'An African Looks at Federation', *Optima*, Vol. 5, no. 4, 1955, 110-114, 111, also available in *Journal of the Royal Commonwealth Society*, Vol. 2, no. 6, 232-36 and Vambe, *An ill-Fated People: Zimbabwe Before and After Rhodes*, (Heinemann, London; 1976), p. 27.

44. Darwin, John, 'The Central African Emergency', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. XXI, no. 3, September 1993, pp. 217-233.

45. The definitive study of imperial and colonial relations is Claire Palley's *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965, with Special Reference to Imperial Control* (Clarendon Press, Oxford; 1966), especially 286-322.

46. For the tone of nationalist propaganda in 1961, see *Democratic Voice International*, April 1961, Welensky Papers, Box 52, file 13, ff 35-46, ff 36-37 had it 'We do not at any rate subscribe to the hypocritical policies of multiracialism, Partnership, as interpreted by Welensky, because we believe in a true democracy, such theories do not just work (sic). We have with us, the natural right to govern or misgovern ourselves in the country of our birth.

47. Willson, 191.

48. Ian Smith took over from Winston Field in 1964, and led Rhodesia to UDI. It is telling that his only entry in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* (ed. Angela Partington, OUP; 1994) has him saying 'I don't believe in black majority rule in Rhodesia - not in a thousand years', the year he conceded majority rule (1976). As unconscious of the irony of echoing an earlier thousand year regime, Smith fought in North Africa, he entitled his memoirs, *The Great Betrayal: the Memoirs of Ian Douglas Smith*, London: Blake Publishing Ltd, 1997.

49. By liberating Mozambique and opening up Rhodesia's eastern border to ZANU infiltration, FRELIMO's 1974 overthrowel of the Portuguese fascist Caetano accelerated Zimbabwe's liberation. ZANU guerillas selected Robert Mugabe as their political go-between. (Martin: 1981).

50. For a historical sociology of Rhodesia society Dane Kennedy, *Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). For a statistical analysis of Rhodesian attitudes, downplayed by Kennedy see, Rogers and Frantz, 23.